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One of the Standard criticisms of the ontological argument takes 
the form of a reductio ad absurdum. Rather than beginning with 
the idea of God, critics begin with the idea of a non-existent or 
contingent object. They then purport to argue mutatis mutandis to 
the absurd conclusion that the non-existent object exists or that 
the contingent object exists necessarily. I shall develop a dialectic 
between Descartes and several of his critics to illustrate (and rebut) 
various forms of this reductio. The essence of my defense is the 
claim that Descartes' argument for God's existence ranges over a 
limited set of ideas—a set that excludes those ideas traditionally 
used to formulate the reductio. Furthermore, if the Doctrine of 
Divine Property Simplicity is true (as Descartes believes that it 
is), then the set of ideas has only one member—the idea of God. 
And if this is the case then no reductio of this sort can ever work. 
Caterus' Lion 
In the First Set of Objections Caterus develops his version of 
the reductio by beginning with the idea of an "existent lion" (CSM 
II, 72). Like the idea of God, the idea of an "existent lion" 
necessarily has the property of existence.1 The parallel reasoning 
is supposed to run as follows: 
Descartes Caterus 
P I ) I have an idea of God that PI ) I have an idea of an "existent 
necessarily has the lion" that necessarily has the 
property of existence. property of existence. 
C) God necessarily exists. C) An existent lion necessarily 
exists, (false) 
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Descartes can simply reply that Caterus has focused on the 
wrong modality, for there is a difference between an idea that 
necessarily involves contingent existence and an idea that 
necessarily involves necessary existence. Caterus' lion is the 
former, and Descartes' God is the latter. Therefore the reasoning 
is not parallel. 
Descartes 
P I ) I have an idea of God that 
necessarily has the 
property of necessary 
existence. 
Caterus 
PI ) I have an idea of an "existent 
lion" that necessarily has the 
property of contingent 
existence. 
For this reason, Caterus' version of the reductio fails. 
Russell's Golden Mountain (Part I) 
Russell offers a more promising example in the form of the idea of 
an "existent golden mountain." His argument is superior to Caterus' 
insofar as Russell does not illicitly change modality. 
Caterus 
PI ) I have an idea of an "existent 
lion" that necessarily has the 
property of contingent 
existence. 
Russell 
PI ) I have an idea of an "existent 
golden mountain" that necessarily 
has the property of cont ingent 
existence. 
C) An "existent lion" necessarily 
exists. 
C) An "existent golden mountain" 
contingently exists, (false) 
Therefore, Russell's reductio is a success if the Cartesian argument 
is an argument about the nature of existence. 
Descartes 
P I ) I have an idea of God that 
necessarily has the 
property of necessary 
existence. 
Russell 
PI ) I have an idea of an "existent 
golden mountain" that necessarily 
has the property of cont ingent 
existence. 
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C) God necessarily exists, 
contingently 
C) An "existent golden mountain' 
exists, (false) 
Perhaps the ontological argument is designed to demonstrate 
that ideas that entail existence (of whatever sort) necessitate that 
the objects of those ideas exist. Thus ideas that entail necessary 
existence (like God) necessarily exist, and ideas that entail 
contingent existence (like an "existent golden mountain") 
contingently exist. And since the latter is obviously false, Russell's 
reductio appears to succeed. It is my contention that the Cartesian 
argument is not an argument about the nature of existence—it is 
an argument about the nature of perfection. In order to see how 
this is the case we need to take a detour into the notion of 
"perfection." 
The standard definition of perfection has three features. 
Perfections constitute a subset of the class of great-making 
properties. A great-making property is a property that is 
intrinsically better to possess than to lack. So, for example, if it is 
intrinsically better to be in a certain state of knowledge k than the 
corresponding state of ignorance ~£, then being in state k is a great-
making property. Beings who have the property k are "greater" 
than those who do not. 
Properties, in general, can be divided into those that admit of 
degrees and those that do not. Properties that admit of degrees 
include quickness, sadness, healthiness, and reddishness . 
Properties that do not admit of degrees include being pregnant, 
being distinct from the number 7, and having four sides. 
Furthermore, properties that admit of degrees can be divided into 
those that have a logical maximum and those that do not. For 
example, being reddish has the logical maximum of being red. 
Nothing is more reddish than an instance of the color red. In 
contrast, the property of length does not have a logical maximum. 
There is no longest possible length. These notions allow us to 
Perfection 
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identify three individually necessary and jointly sufficient 
conditions for being a perfection. A perfection is a degreed great-
making property with a logical maximum. 2 
The Problem of Infinity 
Before we return to Russell's Golden Mountain, it is important 
to determine whether there is any reason to believe that Descartes 
is working under some other understanding of perfection. 
Descartes often refers to God's perfections as "infinite." This 
seems to be incompatible with the understanding of perfections as 
necessarily possessing logical maxima, for logical maxima entail 
finitude. However, in speaking about his own exemplification of 
the perfection of knowledge, Descartes makes the following claim: 
"What is more, even if my knowledge always increases 
more and more, I recognize that it will never actually be 
infinite, since it will never reach the point where it is not 
capable offurther increase; God, on the other hand, I take 
to be actually infinite, so that nothing can be added to his 
perfection" (CSMII , 32, emphasis mine). 
This passage makes it clear that Descartes does not use the 
term "infinity" to identify a property without a logical maximum. 
He uses it in precisely the opposite manner—to identify a property 
that does have a logical maximum. Therefore, when Descartes 
claims that God has "infinite" knowledge and power, what he is 
asserting is that God possesses the logically maximal amount of 
both knowledge and power. Descartes also tends to refer to infinite 
perfections as "supreme." So, for example, whereas Descartes 
exemplifies merely the "perfection" of power, God exemplifies 
the "supreme perfection" of omnipotence. This will become an 
important distinction, for much hangs on the difference between a 
less-than-maximal exemplification of some perfection and a 
maximal exemplification thereof. 
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Russell's Golden Mountain (Part II) 
Let us briefly review the issue that led to our examination of 
perfection. Russell's version of the reductio moves from the idea 
of a contingent golden mountain to its contingent existence in 
precisely the same manner that the ontological argument moves 
from the idea of a necessarily existent God to His necessary 
existence. Unlike Caterus Russell does not illicitly change 
modality. Thus, Russell's reductio is a success if the Cartesian 
argument is an argument about the nature of existence. But it is 
my contention that it is not. Instead it is an argument about the 
nature of perfection. 
This claim is borne out by Descartes' answer to Caterus in the 
First Reply to Objections. It is here that Descartes argues for God's 
necessary existence, based not on a premise involving existence 
but on the premise that we have a clear and distinct idea of an 
omnipotent being. That is to say that he argues from the supreme 
perfection of omnipotence to the supreme perfection of necessary 
existence. This demonstrates that the set of ideas over which the 
ontological argument ranges is not the set of ideas involving 
existence; it is the set of ideas involving supreme (i.e. maximally 
exemplified) perfection. Neither Caterus' lion nor Russell's golden 
mountain exemplify any supreme perfections. For this reason 
Descartes' argument simply does not apply to them. 
Descartes (5th Med.) 
P I ) I have an idea of 
God that 
necessarily has the 
supreme perfection 
of necessary 
existence 
Descartes (1st Reply) 
P I ) I have an idea of 
God that 
necessarily has 
the supreme 
perfection of 
omnipotence 
Russell 
P I ) I have an idea 
of an "existent 
golden 
mountain" that 
necessarily has the 
less than sup reme 
perfection of 
contingent 
existence, 
than supreme 
perfection of 
contingent 
existence. 
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C) A supremely 
perfect being 
necessarily exists. 
C) A supremely 
perfect being 
necessarily exists. 
C) A less than 
perfect mountain 
contingently exists. 
Descartes' argument only warrants arguing from an idea 
possessing some supreme perfection (omnipotence, omniscience, 
impeccability, etc.) to an instance of that idea possessing the 
supreme perfection of necessary existence. Therefore, in order 
for a reductio of this sort to work, one must begin with an idea that 
entails some supreme perfection or another—the idea of an 
omnipotent being or the idea of an omniscient being, etc. Existent 
lions and golden mountains will not suffice. 
There remains one final version of the reductio worthy of our 
consideration. Some critics have suggested that the Cartesian 
argument for God's existence can also be used to prove the 
existence of a supremely perfect island. This version takes into 
account the fact that the Cartesian argument is about the nature of 
perfection rather than existence. Perhaps if we have the idea of a 
supremely perfect island, its very perfection entails its necessary 
existence. For how could I, an imperfect being, have originated 
such a perfect idea of a tropical paradise? It must exist in order to 
explain my possession of the idea. 
In order to make this argument precisely analogous it helps to 
specify exactly what "supreme perfection" the island possesses. 
Presumably, the perfection in question is beauty.3 We can thereby 
formulate the following successful version of the reductio: 
Descartes (1 st Reply) The Perfectly Beautiful Island 
P I ) I have an idea of a supremely perfect P I ) I have an idea of a supremely 
being (God) that exemplifies the perfect island that exemplifies the 
supreme perfection of omnipotence, supreme perfection of maximal 
A Perfect Island 
beauty. 
C) A supremely perfect being 
necessarily exists. 
C) A supremely perfect island 
necessarily exists. 
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A Simple Defense 
This would be the end of the matter if not for Descartes' 
commitment to the traditional theistic Doctrine of Divine Property 
Simplicity.4 In the Third Meditation Descartes affirms his belief 
in the simplicity of God's "attributes": 
"The unity, the simplicity, or the inseparability of all 
the attributes of God is one of the most important of the 
perfections which I understand him to have" (CSM II , 34). 
Now there seem to me to be two possible meanings of the 
word "attributes." On one hand, God's "attributes" might be 
nothing more than His properties. On the other, God's "attributes" 
might be restricted to some subset of divine properties unique to 
Him such as His "supreme perfections" (as exemplified in 
Descartes' frequent lists of divine attributes—omnipotence, 
omniscience, etc.). The first meaning is indefensible (although 
that does not mean Descartes was not committed to it). For the 
Doctrine of Divine Property Simplicity is the claim that some of 
God's properties are metaphysically indistinguishable. This claim 
cannot be true about all of God's properties (where the term 
property is broadly construed), for some of God's properties are 
unique to Him (i.e. aseity) and others are shared with other things 
(i.e. knowing the name of the author of this essay). But if all of 
God's properties are united in a simple whole that does not admit 
of distinctions, then there is no difference between aseity and 
knowing my name. Aside from the incredible counter-intuitiveness 
of this claim, it implies that anyone who knows my name is also 
the creator of everything distinct from himself or herself (and this 
is patently false). 
The upshot is that in order for the Doctrine of Divine Property 
Simplicity to be defensible, it must range over a set of properties 
unique to God. As noted earlier, in the First Reply to Objections 
Descartes argues from God's omnipotence to his necessary 
existence. This makes sense once one recognizes Descartes' 
commitment to divine property simplicity. For God's properties 
are not diverse—they are simple. Thus they are all identical to 
each other and to God Himself. So God = Omnipotence = 
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Omniscience = Necessary Existence and so on. Given this 
traditional theistic conception of God, it becomes clear Descartes' 
argument from Omnipotence to Necessary Existence is merely a 
particular implication of Divine Simplicity. He could have argued 
from any of God's unique, simple attributes to any other attribute. 
For example, the fact that I have an idea of an impeccable being 
entails that this impeccable being exists (maximal goodness to 
necessary existence). And the fact that I have an idea of an 
omniscient being entails that I have an idea of an omnipotent being. 
This applies to the Ontological Argument because necessary 
existence is part of the simple unity of God. Thus the Ontological 
Argument can be used to argue from our "idea" of any of the simple 
divine attributes. And this has the added implication that the 
Ontological Argument is not an argument about existence (as 
Russell thought) or even about perfection (as friends of the Perfect 
Island think). It is instead an argument that ranges over the set of 
God's attributes that are united in a simple whole—a set that, 
strictly speaking, has only one member—despite appearances to 
the contrary. 
Classical Theism 
P I ) I have idea of a supremely perfect being 
that exemplifies one proper ty tha t is 
un ique to itself and to which it is 
identical. This property can be described 
as "omnipotence," "necessary existence,"' 
"omniscience," etc. 
C) A supremely perfect being necessarily exists. 
Therefore, if the Doctrine ofDivine Property Simplicity is true, 
then no reductio of the sort proposed will ever work. For the 
argumentation in the Ontological Argument simply does not apply 
to anything outside of God and thus cannot be used to argue for 
the existence of other contingent or non-existent entities. 
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